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MPRPBY: THE INVISIBLE PRINCE 
One of the most haunting and horrifyingly realistic figures 
in the history of literature has been Niccolo Machiavelli . His 
name has stood for all that is dark, deep and treacherous in 
statesmanship , yet his philosophy has survived to this day . 
While his work The Prince purports to be a how-to book for the 
Renaissance ruler to maintain power, his philosophy has gained a 
disturbing acceptance in contemporary society. As Justice Murphy 
points out, ethics of society have fallen victim to this dark yet 
pragmatic view of how to achieve success. 
Machiavelli's philosophy of the ends justifying the means 
has been employed by members from almost every sector of society . 
The Iran-Contra scandal illustrates how a few members of the 
government try to justify their abuse of power by claiming their 
actions are taken in the name of freedom. The recent insider 
trading scandals of Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken remind us that 
the corporate sector is infested with those who practice 
predatory business agendas, both legal and illegal . 
The specter of Machiavelli can also be seen in the current 
I 
state of the legal profession . An inherent quality of the field 
of law is that an attorney must represent a client zealously, 
whether the client is Charles Manson or Jimmy Stewart . If he 
were alive today, Machiavelli would have had no difficulty with 
representing an unfavorable client. In 1512, Machiavelli was 
plucked from his political office and imprisoned by the Medici. 
Despite years of torture, he sought employment at the palace of 
his tormentor, Lorenzo de Medici. Machiavelli offered his work, 
The Prince, to convince Lorenzo that his political talents were 
required to maintain order. 
Many lay persons view the lawyer as just such, a gun for 
hire. The public sees the lawyer not as an officer of the court 
seeking the truth, but rather as a contractor attaining the goal 
sought by his client. The public sees an attorney embracing a 
client, an alleged underworld figure, after a verdict of not 
guilty is announced. The public sees a defense attorney trying 
to get his client exonerated by procedural defect even if the 
substantive proof clearly calls for a conviction. These images 
do not make the legal profession seem ethical to the rest of 
society. In the public's eye, maybe Shakespeare was right on 
target when he penned the phrase "let's kill all the lawyers." 
In our day, corruption in politics is commonplace and 
occasionally expected. Ethics in government and the legal 
profession continue to be an overriding concern in bar 
associations across the country. One thing is definite, 
Machiavelli was obviously a man ahead of his time and would have 
made both an effective lawyer or politician today. Whether the 
legal profession should strive for Machiavellian qualities is a 
disturbing question which Justice Murphy explores in the 
following lecture. 

"THE INVISIBLE PRINCE" 
Hon. Francis T. Murphy 
17th Annual John F. Sonnett Memorial Lecture 
November 2, 1988 
Fordham University School of Law 
On a December night in 1513, a poor, thin, middle-aged man of 
medium height, having a bony face, piercing eyes, and thin lips lining 
a secretive smile, entered a little house in Sant'Andrea, seven miles 
from Florence. For fourteen years he had been a dedicated 
statesman of Florence which he had so lbved that, fourteen years 
later, two months before his death, he wrote to his friend, Francesco 
Vettori, "I love my native city more than my own soul." In August, 
1512, Florence had been sacked by the Medici, and, in November, 
he was dismissed from office. In February, 15i3, fWo assassins, 
intent upon slaying Giuliano de'Medici, were arrested. Four days 
later, they were executed. In the possession of one of them, a list 
of about twenty names was found, among them that of our poor 
friend. He was seized and tied to a rack. Normally, four turns were 
the maximum torture inflicted by the rack, but our friend endured 
six turns, yet he would not confess. In March, 1513, after having 
been kept handcuffed and shackled in prison, the walls of which 
were "full of lice so big and fat they seem like butterflies," he was 
released. Exiled from Florence, he returned to his five children, to 
whom he had been a good father, and to his wife, to whom he was 
constantly affectionate, and constantly unfaithful. After he entered 
that little house that December night, he sat at his table and, in a 
remarkable letter to his friend, Vettori, he described his 
impoverished, desolate life. In autumn, he wrote, he had been rising 
before dawn and going out with bird cages on his back in order to 
snare thrushes. Now, in winter, he rose with the sun and engaged 
in the selling of wood and in the petty arguments that accompanied 
it. At lunch, his family and he ate meager food. At the local inn, 
he spoke to travelers, and played cards all day with the innkeeper, 
the butcher, a miller, and two bakers. With these there were many 
loud and offensive arguments over a few pennies. In words that, 
like a door flying open, suddenly reveal his soul, he told Vettori: 
"Caught this way among these lice I wipe the mold from my brain 
and release my feeling of being ill-treated by Fate: I am happy to 
be driven along this road by her, as I wait to see if she will be 
ashamed of doing so." In one of the famous passages of Italian 
literature, our friend told Vettori what he does at night: 
"When evening comes, I return to my home, and I go 
into my study; and on the threshold, I take off my everyday 
clothes, which are covered with mud and mire, and I put on 
regal and curial robes; and dressed in a more appropriate manner 
I enter into the ancient courts of ancient men and I am 
welcomed by them kindly, and there I taste the food that alone 
is mine, and for which I was born; and there I am not ashamed 
to speak to them, to ask them the reas9ns for their actions; and 
they, in their humanity, answer me; and for four hours I feel no 
boredom, I dismiss every affiiction, I no longer fear poverty nor 
do I tremble at the thought of death: I become completely part 
of them .... I have noted down what I have learned from their 
conversations, and I composed a little work . . . where I delve 
as deeply as I can into thoughts of this subject, discussing what 
a principality is, what kinds there are, how they are acquired, 
how they are maintained, why they are lost. 
Thus, in that little house was The Prince Written· by' Niccolo 
Machiavelli, in spirit talking as a peer to the great ancients, to 
Aristotle, Caesar, Cicero, and Alexander.1 
The Prince, one of the most powerful political works ever 
written, was given by Machiavelli to Lorenzo de'Medici, the ruler of 
Florence, in the vain hope that Machiavelli would thus prove himself 
of value to the Medici and would be able to support his family by 
having a position in that world of politics that he loved with 
unbridled passion. Indeed, Machiavelli wrote to Vettori, "I am 
wearing myself away, and I cannot remain in this state for long 
without being despised for my poverty, opt to mention my desire 
that these Medici lords begin to make use of me, even if they start 
me off by rolling stones."2 
Machiavelli's writing of The Prince was indeed a curiously ugly 
gift, for by it he betrayed himself. As a servant of the Florentine 
republic, he had proved his absolute de'dication to the ideal of 
freedom in a republic. Now, for the sake of a political job, for the 
sake of entering the political game that was his inner life, he wrote -
The Prince, a handbook for autocrats, a bedside book for those who 
would use the state to dominate the people. Lorenzo· de'Medici, ·it 
is said, accepted Machiavelli's gift of The Prince with less enthusiasm 
than two hunting dogs that were given to him at the same time.3 
The story is told in proof of Lorenzo's intellectual insensibility. I 
read the story differently. Lorenzo, I suspect, knew that two hunting 
dogs would give him more loyalty than a politician whose principles 
were for sale. 4 
This slim book is one of the classics of our civilization. Like the 
Bible, few have read it and everyone claims to know its contents. 5 
What did Machiavelli write in The Prince that so captured the 
imagination that, for more than four hundred and fifty years, many 
have read his words, celebrated their realism inwardly, yet drawn 
back from publicly identifying with him?6 What in Machiavellianism 
made the noted twentieth-century German historian, Meinecke, say 
that it "was a sword thrust in the body politic of Western humanity, 
causing it to cry out and to struggle against itselr'?7 Why did the 
philosopher, Maritain, say of it that it was "the most violent 
mutilation suffered by the human practical intellect".8 Yet what is 
it, in the face of these judgments, that makes it the rare reader who 
puts down The Prince without an inexplicable disquiet, perhaps the 
pain of a suppressed benevolence towards Machiavelli for appealing 
to that pagan desire for an amoral realism that lies deep within each 
of us? 
What did Machiavelli write in The Prince? 
Man, said Machiavelli, desires the creation of a powerful State. 
However, in order to create such a state man cannot have delusions 
about mankind, else the truth will punish him. He must therefore 
closely observe reality and history, particularly the minds of antiquity, 
for man never changes. He is everywhere and always the same. 
Therefore, man must guard against those who do not look at men 
as they are, but who look at them as they ought to be. Statesmen 
of that idealistic kind do not deal with things as they are; they drag 
men to ruin. They commit the mortal sin of unrealism. Men are 
not as Jews and Christians idealize them. In the main, men are, 
said Machiavelli, "ungrateful, wanton, false and dissimulating, 
~owardl~ and greedy . . . arrogant and mean, their natural impulse 
is to be msolent when their affairs are prospering and abjectly servile 
when adversity hits them."9 There is no universal scheme no a 
. . ' pnon .method, by w.hich one can learn about man. Men say they 
love liberty, when, m fact, they care little for it. The idea means 
more to them than its reality. Liberty means less to them than 
s~curity a?d proper~. Man responds to love, but in dealing with 
him fear IS more reliable, though the ruler should be cautious that 
fear does not turn into hate. As for the morals of the men in 
Machiavelli's ideal state, these are to be found in the classical 
societies that dominated Machiavelli's imagination. States, he says, 
are made great by pagan virtues -- power, pride, public spirit, 
austerity, the pursuit of glory, and the expansion of the patria. 
And now we come to Machiavelli's notoriously dark side. He is 
so candid that one can almost become fonq of him. Machiavelli tells 
us that, in order to rule, one may have to be ruthless. Force and 
fraud, cruelty, treachery, and even the slaying of the innocent, may 
be used. If men must be governed by measures that violate 
Judea-Christian morals, then so be it. And th~ is t}le heart of 
Machiavellianism. Machiavelli did not liberate politics· from morais, 
or ethics, or religion. Machiavelli said that man must choose 
between a pagan and a Judea-Christian life. If he chooses the 
Judea-Christian life, then man chooses virtues that are insuperable 
obstacles to the creation of that Roman society that men want. 
~achiavelli does not deny that what Jews and Christians call good 
IS actually good, and what is evil, is indeed evil. He does not say 
that. cruelty, fraud, and the slaying of the innocent are good 
attnbutes. He argued simply that it is impossible to practice 
Judea-Christian virtues and enjoy a strong society. Practice 
Judea-Christian virtues and you will be politically impotent, for the 
powerful, the clever, and the unscrupulous are waiting in the woods 
to overwhelm you. If you want Athens or Rome, take your eyes 
away from Jerusalem. This unresolved choice between two 
incompatible moral worlds is the secret wound that man suffers until 
today, and suffered before Machiavelli wrote The Prince. 
Expressing varying levels of horror, Machiavelli's commentators 
have given The Prince meanings so different that one wonders 
whether they have read the same text. Some say that The Prince is 
a satire.10 Others say it is a disguised warbing or cautionary tract.11 
One thinks The Prince a literary performance common in the 
Renaissance, a "mirror for princes. "12 Others say that it is an 
anti-Christian piece, a defense of the pagan life.\3 Others see in 
him a kind of Hamlet, a humanist grieved by human vices that make 
evil decisions politically unavoidable, thus he separated politics from 
ethics.14 Some look at Machiavelli as a technician of power, 
ethically and politically neutral.15 Many identify Machiavelli as the 
supreme realist.16 Among the multitude standing in the 
bibliographical forest, there are those who say that Machiavelli saw 
the State as a work of art, and so treated politics as an esthetic 
exercise.17 An original interpreter saw Machiavelli as a religious and 
national reformer who might have been for the Italians, if they had 
been like the Germans, what Luther, Machiavelli's contemporary ~ , 
had been for ~erma.n~. Whatever these views, the one commonly 
held of Machiavelli IS that of most Elizabethan dramatists and 
scholars: For them, Machiavelli was called by the devil to lead men 
straight to hell.19 
While opinions of Machiavelli and his origination of The Prince 
vary radically, the text of The Prince is fixed for those who want to 
jud~e its ethical nature. For them, Machiavellianism is an unarmed, 
stationary target. 
Of course, Machiavelli was a radical pessimist who did not see 
in man the image of God, and thus anointed the forehead of 
totalitarianism. Of course, politics is a part of ethics. Everyone can 
see that Machiavelli reversed that relationship by shaping ethics for 
the sake of politics. Indeed, he taught that religion should be used 
for the State because of religion's "power as a myth in unifying the 
masses and cementing their morale."20 Certainly, the true end of 
politics is the common good, an ethical ehd, while for Machiavelli 
the purpose of politics was conquest by power. And surely everyone 
knows the answers of personal ethics to political ethics, that man 
may never commit evil for any good of any kind, and that the 
common good is provided by justice and political'morality.21 Yet, 
while these arguments are intellectually persuasive, they do not 
explain why man is so drawn to Machiavelli, almost like a sightseer 
drawn to an abyss. It is this human fact that draws me to 
Machiavelli as the subject of this address, for it has led me to detect 
in Machiavelli the invisible Prince in our society, a society that 
Machiavelli could never have foreseen. 
There is something in Machiavelli's brutally frank choice of evil 
over good that simultaneously facinates and repels man. If ~ 
~ was a mirror for princes, Machiavelli is in some way a mirror 
for man. The choice between good and evil, like a persistent beggar 
standing at the door of man's soul, demands an answer to the 
tormenting question of whether God exists. In writing The Prince, 
however, Machiavelli did not assume that God exists. Indeed, be 
showed no interest in conscience or in any theological issue, for The 
~ is not an abstract or philosophical treatise. It is an empirical 
analysis of politics written independently of any philosophical 
construct. Machiavelli, neither a jurist nor a philosopher, was free 
of the intellectual convictions of bis age. He does not even refer to 
natural law, the language of which was used in his time by Christians 
and pagans, jurists, philosophers and theologians. In The Prince, 
there is no sign of Platonic or Aristotelian teleology, no allusion to 
any ideal order, no shadow of any belief in man's place in nature. 
Machiavelli lays all of his cards on the table face-up. He warns us 
that he has taken a path never before trodden by any man. 
Man, however, knows that the moral nature of his life, and that 
of the world, turns upon the answer to the abstract but very real 
question of God's existence. And man knows the answer that 
ordinary man has given. 
Man does not know whether God exists. Man, if he has given 
the matter any consideration, believes that God exists and hopes that 
good will be rewarded and evil punished in an afterlife. If this is so, 
if man's soul is like a frozen sea out of which he can escape only by 
faith, then the man of faith, just as Machiavelli has said, has much 
to fear, for he knows also that among the mass of mankind faith is 
for many, if not for most, a dry reed waiting for the first soft wind 
to break it. Hence, man's anxiety over Machiavellianism is rooted, 
on one hand, in a sense of genuine peril should he live totally in 
faith, and, on the other hand, in a revulsion for the evil of which -
he is capable should he, in his painful, existential condition, deny 
God. Nor is man's sense of a Machiavellian danger limited to 
Machiavellianism in politics. Logically, Machiavellianism engages not 
only political life but the whole of human life.22 Thus the reader 
of The Prince profoundly senses that only his faith in God separates 
him from Machiavelli, and that that faith, under pressure, may give 
way, as it does whenever be violates any of bis moral beliefs. Man, 
after all, knows nothing if be does not know bis own inconstant 
heart. Further, if the reader of The Prince reflects at all upon what 
Machiavelli has said, be will suddenly realize that The Prince, written 
for the eyes of a prince over four hundred and fifty years ago, might 
as well have been addressed to the reader's ears for his guidance as 
an ordinary citizen in a modern democracy. 
What one man may do, millions may do as one man. Hence, 
Macbiavellianism may be expressed in the majoritarian rule of a 
democracy as well as in the person of an autocrat.23 It may be 
expressed by people acting independently of their governmental 
structures. It may be found in priva(e social institutions, in 
economic classes, behind the eyeglasses of a profession, and under 
the birettas of pious cardinals. Wherever power is consecrated to 
the preservation of an entity or of a class, there in the evening 
twilight sits the invisible Prince. Indeed, his residence bas a 
chameleon character, for he always seemsi to be in someone else's 
country, never one's own. Yet, however invisible he may be, he 
leaves an imprint, a mark, a scar. Our nation yields examples, past 
and current, from which we naturally avert our eyes. 
Prior to our Civil War, the legislatures of slave states showed 
their love of a much professed Christianity by enacting statutes of a 
kind designed to sustain slavery, and hence the economy of the slave 
states, by stripping the black man of his humanity. Section 59 of 
chapter 92 of the laws of Mississippi of 1840, for example, provided: 
"Sec. 59. If any negro or mulatto shall be found . . 
to have given false testimony, every such offender shall, 
without further trial, be ordered by the . . . court, to have 
one ear nailed to the pillory, and there to stand for the 
space of one hour, and then the said ear to be cut off, and 
hereafter the other ear to be nailed in like manner, and cut 
off at the expiration of one other hour, and moreover to 
receive thirty-nine lashes on his or her bare back, well laid 
on, at the public whipping post ... " 
Alabama's laws of 1843 thoughtfully drove the knife of slavery 
into that part of a black man that would never leave him in doubt 
about his condition: 
"Sec. 16. All slaves are hereby prohibited from 
keeping dogs, under any pretence or consideration 
whatsoever; and the slave or slaves so offending, upon 
complaint thereof before any justice of the peace, shall be 
punished with not exceeding twenty-five stripes for every 
such offense .... " 
A Christian society that would not allow a man a dog would be 
careful about allowing him to learn of the Gospel. Accordingly, the 
people of Alabama provided: 
"Sec. 35. If any slave ... shall preach to ... any ... slaves 
... unless in the presence of five respectable slave-holders, 
any such slave ... shall, on conviction before any justice of the 
peace, receive ... thirty-nine lashes for the first offence, and 
fifty lashes for every offence thereafter .... " 
These slave statutes are not anecdotal material. They are 
laboratory specimens of Machiavellianism. Other historical slides 
may be placed under the microscope. 
Our trade union movement arose O'gt of the clash between 
property's self-interest and labor's demand for social justice. 
However, when our labor unions reached a point of equilibrium 
with their capitalistic managerial opponents, many unions used their 
members for purposes that had little to do with social justice, and 
much to do with the enlargement of raw union power. These union 
members expressed a majoritarian will for 1power that blinded them 
to the ethical character of the means they used and the ends they 
sought. 
Law firms paying large salaries set the standard fdr' the success 
of law schools. Law firms and their clients need skilled legal 
artisans. They do not need lawyers who will question both the 
morality of their professional services and the morality of their 
clients' businesses. Accordingly, it is not by chance that law schools 
do not require the study of moral philosophy, and particularly the 
problems of distributive justice. It is not by chance that law school 
catalogues read like handbooks for uncritical minds intent solely 
upon earning fees. The law school has thus developed as an 
institution less intellectually inquisitive than the university of which 
it is a part. In fitting itself within our economic system, the 
substantial material rewards of which are found neither in the middle 
nor the lower economic classes, it pays the price of accommodation. 
It has produced students whose pockets are stuffed with laws and 
whose minds are as distant from issues of morality as they are from 
problems in biochemistry. 
In the main, our established religions have carefully protected 
their institutional popularity by accommodating themselves to things 
as they are, not as they ought to be. Neither the labor movement, 
nor the struggle of women for equality, nor the confrontation of 
anti-Semitism or racism, nor the peace movement of the Vietnam 
period24 or the peace movement of today, can trace their leadership 
to the steps of institutionalized religion. Notwithstanding the 
unconditional, ethical commitments of our religious faiths, their 
histories in this country have generally shown a contentment with 
silence when speech required courage. 
Surely, the invisible Prince would have approved the silence of 
those churchmen in this country who for generations have known of 
the appalling poverty of Latin America where a feudal system, 
without feudalism's historical justification, enabled landowners to 
dominate the wretched and agonized poor upon whose backs the 
landowners lived. 
Surely, the invisible Prince would have approved the uncritical 
silence of our religious institutions followip.g the nuclear bombings 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to say nothing of the obliteration 
bombing of Dresden and other German cities, acts that violated the 
principle of discrimination in the conduct of warfare. 
Of course, there have been activist clergymen who have engaged 
themselves as their consciences directed, bbt our characterization of 
them as activists distinguishes them from their churches. 
As to activism, one must indeed keep a sharp eye out for the 
invisible Prince. Consider, for example, why our coliege ·students 
demonstrate against apartheid in South Africa, but never, never 
against poverty in the United States. There are about 33 million 
Americans who are poor, and another 20 to 30 million who have so 
little that, by any measure, they are in need. Why are not college 
students demonstrating for the poor in America? Is it because 
American college students have nothing to risk in South Africa but, 
in the United States, they risk much if they have to divide the 
economic pie with the poor? 
Are American college students disciples of a materialism so 
hypocritical, so self-centered, that they pretend to love the black 
poor in Pretoria but would not give a nickel for the tears of the 
black poor in Detroit or the white poor in Georgia? 
Ask our politicians what they actually intend to do for the 
millions of America's poor. You will see that love beyond family, 
bed, and friends has very narrow limits, and that all the Bible 
thumping in the world, all of the praying and chanting, all of the 
handclapping, bowing and singing will not move a hair on a poor 
man's head. 
And then ask how much we are willing to deny ourselves to help 
the poor. If we are willing to do very little, and if we are but a few 
of the tens of millions of our class, then we will begin to see the 
silhouette of the invisible Prince defending a society's economic 
system by violating its religious ethics. Should we look even cl?ser, 
we will see that we, the politically dominant working and nuddle 
classes, eager to compel the upper classes to share econ?mic benefits 
with us, are unwilling to share our economic benefits with the lowest 
economic classes. Moreover, we may hold to our positions even 
though the limitations of our natural resources indicate that t~e 
working and middle classes in the West must make substantial 
sacrifices if the lowest classes are to receive a sufficiency for their 
human development. 
What we do to our poor at home, we do to the poor abroad. 
Developed nations have given only l to 2% of their gross national 
products in assistance to underdeveloped nations. The .failure to 
give more is traceable in great part to the refusal of middle-class 
electorates to reduce their own level of consumption. 
In the end, Machiavelli was right. We must choose between the 
Rome of pagan antiquity and the Jerusalem of Judeo-Christian 
ideals. And Machiavelli was right in his view that the great body of 
mankind chooses neither Rome nor Jerusalem but instead vacillates 
between them, attempts to compromise, weakem and· fails. Y ~t, 
Machiavelli was fatally wrong about the nature of man. He saw m 
man a selfish, treacherous animal, unchangeable by time or place, 
whose history was worthy of study because it was bound to repeat 
itself. Machiavelli therefore chose Rome. 
Man, however, is not the weak victim of the rules of a Platonic 
world of perfection. He is capable of living an ethical life while 
doing so with the cunning of the serpent and the innocence of the 
dove. 25 He is capable of living a life in which he has transcended 
himself by reaching out in love to others. If he lives that life, the 
life of the Judeo-Christian tradition, then he will have lived a life 
in a dimension that has made him truly human. In the end, he will 
know that by love he has touched the heart of the mystery of 
creation. 
If, however, man chooses a life in the abyss between Rome and 
Jerusalem, then he will have taken, in M~chiavelli's words, "middle 
ways that are very injurious".26 Medicine yields an appropriate 
analogy. 
There is in neurology a curious, catastrophic condition sometimes 
suffered by victims of stroke. In 1the prose of medical 
understatement, it is called "neglect of the left."27 
The patient acts as if nothing is wrong, yet he reports that his 
left side has disappeared. When shown his paralyzed left. arm, he 
denies that it is his arm, asserts that it belongs to someone else, and 
taking hold of it may fling it aside. He looks dull, apathetic, 
inattentive. He is indifferent to failure, and reports a feeling of 
"something missing". He neglects the left side of his body in 
dressing and grooming. He fails to shave one side of his face or to 
comb his hair on one side. He cannot put on eyeglasses or insert 
dentures, for half of him does not exist. His perception of the unity 
of his body, of the bodily parts to one another, has been ripped root 
and branch from his mind. At night, while other patients sleep, he 
lies in bed, repeatedly pressing his right side against a sideboard, all 
in search of an unreachable sense of limitation, of wholeness, of 
unity. 
So it is with Machiavelli's conception of man. The half of him 
that is animalistic, that is attracted by the invisible Prince, that part 
remains; but the part that inclines itself to God, to "what ought to 
be", is abandoned and atrophies.28 A sense of subtle paralysis of 
the will intrudes and, with it, a sense of a lack of wholeness, of 
unity, a sense of the abyss. In pathology, the condition is called a 
morbid inertia. In theology, it is called "an oppressive sorrow that 
so weighs upon a man's mind that he wants not to exercise any 
virtue". It .is the deadly sin of sloth, the sin of neglect by which we 
separate ourselves from humanity. It is the sin by which we open 
our door to the world only wide enough to take in the morning 
paper. 
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